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Guaranteed Jurisdiction: The Emerging Role of 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) in the Acquisition of 
Personal Jurisdiction of Foreign Nationals in 
Internet Intellectual Property Disputes 
Jeffrey R. Armstrong, Esq. ** 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the negotiations over the terms of what would 
later become the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, many less developed countries 
bitterly complained that the United States was, along with 
other more developed countries, attempting to exert domination 
and control over the world marketplace for intellectual property 
matters.1  While this controversy will no doubt continue to spur 
endless debate, one inter-related issue that has quietly 
undergone very interesting and substantial changes in the last 
fifteen years is the extent to which U.S. courts may acquire 
jurisdiction over non-U.S. citizens to determine Internet related 
intellectual property disputes. 
As will be examined more fully below, the largely 
unnoticed enactment of FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (“RULE 4(k)(2)”) 
provides a powerful tool for U.S. plaintiffs to bring 
international owners of Internet web sites, who previously 
would have been immune from suit, to U.S. courts.  The effect 
of this tool may offer U.S. citizens the very type of overarching 
control over the worldwide marketplace for Internet based 
 
* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
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 1. See, e.g., Lekshmi Sarma, Comment, Biopiracy: Twentieth Century 
Imperialism in the Form of International Agreements, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 107, 118 (1999). 
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intellectual property rights that less developed countries fear. 
Part I of this article will examine general concepts of 
jurisdiction as they have been applied to Internet transactions.  
Part II will discuss the emergence of RULE 4(k)(2) and trace its 
early development in non-Internet cases.  Part III will examine 
newly decided cases that apply RULE 4(k)(2) to Internet 
intellectual property disputes and, in so doing, will 
demonstrate the extraordinary breadth of jurisdiction this new 
statute provides. Part IV will analyze the effect of this 
jurisdictional development on international relations to the 
extent that such development concerns intellectual property 
matters.  Finally, Part IV will also offer recommendations for 
an international protocol standardizing the means by which 
national courts determine how and when to assert jurisdiction 
over foreign defendants.  This protocol would minimize the 
possibility of an escalating controversy between nations 
concerning the inappropriate assertion of jurisdiction over non-
residents. 
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I.  BACKGROUND OF RULE 4, PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Every analysis of modern federal jurisdiction must begin 
with the 1963 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Revised FED. R. CIV. P. 4 allowed federal courts to acquire 
personal jurisdiction over parties by incorporating the 
particular jurisdictional rules of the state in which the federal 
court was located.2  As a result, personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign defendant could be obtained either by the physical 
presence of that defendant in the forum state or by the 
assertion of rights over a non-resident defendant under the 
long-arm statute of the forum state.3  Thus, assuming that a 
plaintiff did not have the exquisite luck of serving a non-
resident defendant while that defendant was physically present 
in the forum state, a federal court plaintiff would have to 
borrow the applicable state long-arm statute, which would have 
to meet the requisites of the Due Process clause of the United 
States Constitution. 
The seminal case that provided the methodology to 
determine whether a particular state long-arm statute met the 
standards of Due Process is International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington.4  In International Shoe, the Supreme Court 
articulated its famous requirement that the acquisition of 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant (whether 
out-of-state or international) must not offend “traditional 
conception[s] of fair play and substantial justice.” The Court 
also announced a two-part analysis, which focused on: (1) 
whether there were sufficient minimum contacts between the 
defendant and the forum state to justify the submission of the 
defendant to jurisdiction; and (2) whether forcing the defendant 
to defend a suit in the forum state would be “reasonable and 
just.”5 
International Shoe’s “minimum contacts” approach has 
gradually evolved into two entirely separate forms of 
jurisdictional analysis, one based on “general” jurisdictional 
contacts and the other based on “specific” jurisdictional 
contacts.  A determination of whether general jurisdictional 
contacts exist requires an analysis of whether a defendant’s 
 
 2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) 1963 advisory committee’s note. 
 3. Id. 
 4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 5. Id. at 320. 
 66 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:1 
 
contacts with a jurisdictional forum were systematic and 
continuous, while analysis of specific jurisdictional contacts 
instead centers on the nexus between the transaction that was 
the subject of the litigation and the forum state.  Thus, under 
specific jurisdictional analysis, jurisdiction could be found, 
notwithstanding isolated or non-systemic contacts, so long as 
there were contacts with the forum state that actually led to or 
were a part of the cause of action at issue.6 
Modern cases generally use a three-pronged test to 
determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a 
non-resident defendant is appropriate.  In order to exercise 
specific jurisdiction: “(1) the defendant must have sufficient 
‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state, (2) the claim asserted 
against the defendant must arise out of those contacts, and (3) 
the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.”7 
However, for Internet disputes, where the minimum 
contacts between the defendant and the forum state could be 
entirely web-based, the traditional three-pronged test proved 
insufficient.  Ultimately, courts arrived at a new method for 
determining specific jurisdiction minimum contacts.  Zippo 
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.8 has been widely 
cited as the starting point for the analysis of whether an 
Internet based presence within a forum state will fulfill the 
minimum contacts test for specific jurisdiction.9  The Zippo 
court’s contribution was to distinguish between web sites based 
on a measurement of the “nature and quality of commercial 
activity . . . conduct[ed] over the Internet.”10  The Zippo court 
established a “sliding scale” test to determine whether and to 
what extent an Internet web site creates interactivity with the 
forum state.11  Under Zippo, “active” sites are those where 
there is a knowing and repeated transmission of computer files 
 
 6. See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 
(1983). 
 7. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-23 
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. Farino, 960 F.2d 
1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 8. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 9. See., e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3rd 
Cir. 2003) (observing that “[t]he opinion in [Zippo Mfg. Co.] has become a 
seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of 
an Internet web site”); cf Revelle v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(same). 
 10. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 11. Id. 
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between the site and the forum state.12  These repeated 
transmissions compose constitutionally recognized minimum 
contacts and thereby allow for personal jurisdiction.13  
“Passive” sites, which only consist of posted information that 
may be simply viewed over the Internet, will not.14  In the 
middle are those interactive sites that exchange minimal 
information with the forum state.15 
Examples of cases that have found active web sites include 
Zippo and CompuServe.16  In Zippo, the web site contained 
“information about the company, advertisements and an 
application for [the] Internet news service” owned by the 
website operators.17  A prospective subscriber could fill out an 
on-line application and pay for the service either via a supplied 
phone number or through an interactive service on the site.18  
Following payment, the subscriber was assigned a password, 
and the site then acted as a portal for a user to view or 
download Internet newsgroup messages stored on the 
defendant’s web server.19  The Zippo court ruled that these 
interactive transfers of information were part of a “conscious 
choice” by the defendant to conduct business with residents of 
the forum state and thereby sustained the Due Process test of 
minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction.20 
Similarly, in CompuServe, the defendant transmitted 
thirty-two separate “shareware” software programs to the 
CompuServe system, physically located in the forum state of 
Ohio, for others to use and purchase.21  The evidence also 
revealed that a number of Ohio state residents downloaded and 
purchased the shareware programs.22  The CompuServe court 
held that these contacts created a purposeful transaction of 
 
 12. Id. at 1125. 
 13. Id. at 1124. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.; cf. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (6th Cir. 
1996).  The court found that Patterson’s repeated transmissions were evidence 
of purposeful availment of the state of Ohio (the definition of an “active” web-
site for the purpose of this article) rather than an explicit finding of an “active” 
web site. 
 17. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1126. 
 21. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261. 
 22. Id. 
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business in Ohio: the defendant “chose to transmit software 
from Texas [his home state] to CompuServe’s system in Ohio, 
that myriad others gained access to [his] software via that 
system, and that [the defendant] advertised and sold his 
product through that system.”23 
In contrast, Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.24 and Donmar, 
Inc. v. Swanky Partners, Inc.25 held that, under the Zippo test, 
the subject web site was merely passive and had insufficient 
interactivity with the forum state.  Cybersell involved a suit 
between two companies operating under the same name, one 
based in Arizona and the other in Florida.26  The defendant 
(Cybersell Florida) maintained a web site that merely posted 
information about the company and invited users to e-mail 
them to obtain further information about the services it 
offered.27  Donmar involved an out-of-state web site for a 
nightclub (with the tantalizing domain name 
“www.theleopardlounge.com”), where the only interactivity 
involved the web site’s ability to allow users to sign up for a 
mailing list and to receive driving directions.28  Both the 
Cybersell and Donmar courts held that the level of interactivity 
of the web sites was insufficient to demonstrate the “purposeful 
availment” of a forum state that was required by the U.S. 
Constitution.29 
Robbins v. Yutopian Enterprises, Inc.,30 is an interesting 
middle ground case that demonstrates the true reach of the 
Zippo sliding scale test.  There, the web site of the defendant 
not only actively advertised its “Go-Product” game, but took 
orders directly over the Internet.31  Nevertheless, because only 
a limited number of Internet transactions occurred between the 
web site and residents of the forum state, the Robbins court 
ruled that there were insufficient contacts to sustain 
jurisdiction.32  The Robbins court also noted (in a comment that 
 
 23. Id. at 1264-65. 
 24. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 25. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15308 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2002). 
 26. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 414. 
 27. Id. at 415-416. 
 28. Donmar, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15308, at *2. 
 29. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419-20; Donmar, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15308, at *11. 
 30. 202 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D. Md. 2002). 
 31. Robbins, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 430. 
 32. Id. 
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would prove to be highly ironic in view of the subsequent 
enactment of RULE 4(k)(2)) that the assertion of jurisdiction in 
such a case would be unfair, since it would effectively “mean 
that [the defendant] would presumably be subject to general 
personal jurisdiction [anywhere] in the country, thereby 
allowing a plaintiff to sue it for any matter anywhere in the 
nation.”33  The Robbins court observed that “[t]his, the 
constitution does not permit.”34  As will be shown, the effect of 
RULE 4(k)(2) means that a Robbins style defendant would be 
subject to jurisdiction in every state in the United States. 
Robbins is also noteworthy because the level of general 
interactivity of the web site and the level of Internet file 
transmission to and from the web site to other sites was not 
critical to the court’s determination.  Rather, the Robbins court 
chose to focus on the level and intensity of that interactivity 
measured by the particular contacts that the web site had with 
the forum state.35  As this article notes in the discussion of the 
applicability of RULE 4(k)(2), the Robbins court’s 
transformation of the minimum contacts test to measure 
national, as opposed to state-wide, contacts between the web 
site and its target audience, will have substantial repercussions 
on the outcome of jurisdictional contests in Internet related 
intellectual property cases.  For, as will be seen, once the 
question of the amount of contacts between the web site and 
target audience shifts from a state to a national level, the 
jurisdictional reach vastly expands as well. 
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF RULE 4(K)(2) 
RULE 4(k)(2), enacted and effective on December 1, 1993, 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and 
laws of the United States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of 
service is also effective, with respect to claims arising under federal 
law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any 
defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
general jurisdiction of any state.36 
The rule thus provides that a plaintiff may acquire 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident (whether out-of-state 
 
 33. Id. (citing Atlantech Distrib., Inc. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 
2d 534, 537 (D. Md. 1998)). 
 34. Id. (citing Atlantech Distrib., 30 F. Supp. 2d at 537). 
 35. Id. 
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (2003). 
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or a foreign national) in any federal district within the United 
States if the following criteria are met: (1) the plaintiff’s claim 
against the defendant is based on a federal question; (2) the 
defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole are 
sufficient so as not to violate Fifth Amendment concerns 
regarding Due Process and the need for minimum contacts; and 
(3) the defendant is not otherwise subject to personal 
jurisdiction of any state within the United States. 
Interestingly, RULE 4(k)(2) was enacted as a result of a 
suggestion by the U.S. Supreme Court to Congress in Omni 
Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolph Wolff & Co.37  There, the Court 
held that personal jurisdiction was lacking because of 
insufficient contacts between an English defendant and the 
forum state in a Federal Securities Act lawsuit brought by 
Louisiana residents.  The Court broadly hinted that an 
amendment allowing jurisdiction in a federal question case 
would be appropriate, and impliedly, constitutional.38 
One of the first cases to apply RULE 4(k)(2) was Eskofot 
A/S v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.39 Eskofot involved a 
federal anti-trust claim, where the plaintiff, a Danish 
corporation, alleged that the defendant, a British corporation, 
was  attempting to monopolize “the domestic and international 
market for certain printing equipment and materials.”40  The 
Eskofot court found that personal jurisdiction existed under 
RULE 4(k)(2).41  It therefore did not consider other possible 
bases for jurisdiction.  In order to decide whether the defendant 
had the constitutionally required minimum contacts such that 
defendant was amenable to personal jurisdiction in New York 
federal courts, the Eskofot court adopted, for RULE 4(k)(2) 
purposes, the analysis previously used by the Second Circuit to 
interpret New York’s long arm statute prior to the enactment of 
 
 37. 484 U.S. 97, 109, 111 (1987). 
 38. The Omni Capital Court reasoned that: 
A narrowly tailored service of process provision [in the Federal 
Rules], authorizing service on an alien in a federal-question case 
when the alien is not amenable to service under the applicable state 
long-arm statute, might well serve the ends of the CEA [Commodities 
Exchange Act] and other federal statutes.  It is not for the federal 
courts, however, to create such a rule as a matter of common law.  
That responsibility, in our view, better rests with those who propose 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with Congress. 
Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 111. 
 39. 872 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 40. Id. at 83. 
 41. Id. at 87. 
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RULE  4(k)(2).42  Under this analysis, the Eskofot court asked 
whether, as to a foreign national, (1) the defendant transacted 
business in the United States; (2) whether it did an act in the 
United States; or (3) whether there was “an effect in the United 
States caused by an act done elsewhere.”43 
The Eskofot court centered on the third factor and held 
that sufficient facts had been presented by the plaintiff to at 
least raise a question of fact as to whether the defendant had 
engaged in anti-competitive activities that significantly affected 
the United States market.44  The court sustained jurisdiction, 
at least for purposes of denying a motion to dismiss.45 
Critical analysis of Eskofot reveals an extraordinarily 
expansive view of RULE 4(k)(2).  The plaintiff alleged only that 
defendants “have the capacity to” and “currently sell a certain 
percentage” of their products in the United States.46  The 
plaintiff did not allege any purposeful activity whatsoever 
within the United States except for the assertion that “a 
certain percentage” of products were sold and sent to a point of 
origin within the United States.47  Nevertheless, the Eskofot 
court held that a prima facie case of jurisdiction was 
established.48 The Eskofot factors have been followed by a 
number of courts in later cases.49 
Surprisingly, the trend set in motion by Eskofot continued.  
Subsequent cases have uniformly followed this expansive view 
of the reach of RULE 4(k)(2), often with scant support in the 
pleaded facts of the cases on the issue of minimum contacts 
aside from the sale of products to points within the United 
States.  For example, in Szafarowicz v. Golterup,50 the court 
held that a foreign defendant might be amenable to jurisdiction 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 
1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
 44. Id. at 88. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 85. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 86. 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 945 F. Supp. 609, 
617 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (establishing jurisdiction over foreign corporation arising 
solely from effects in the United States of actions taken in another country); 
see also Szafarowicz v. Gotterup, 68 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(allowing limited “jurisdictional discovery” to determine whether the Eskofot 
factors were satisfied). 
 50. 68 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D. Mass. 1999). 
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merely as a result of the targeting of U.S. customers through 
magazine advertisements and the use of a booking agent within 
the United States for U.S. customers.51  The court in 
Szafarowicz did hint at one limitation to its grant of 
jurisdiction under RULE 4(k)(2).  It found that jurisdiction did 
not exist for all purposes, but merely for discovery purposes.52  
The court stated that discovery should be permitted to find out 
if defendant had generated “significant business through its 
marketing in the United States.”53  To that end, the 
Szafarowicz court permitted the plaintiff to engage in 
“jurisdictional discovery.”54 
Perhaps the most remarkable example of the looseness 
with which RULE 4(k)(2) has been construed may be found in 
United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd.55  This case arose when 
the U.S. government attempted to enforce a forfeiture action 
against John Fitzgerald, a U.S. citizen.56  Fitzgerald had 
deposited sums in overseas bank accounts, including some in 
the Swiss American Bank branch in Antigua.57  The U.S. 
government alleged that Swiss American had disbursed sums 
in disregard of constructive notice of the government’s claim.58  
The U.S. government reasoned that constructive notice was the 
result of publications pertaining to the forfeiture in newspapers 
of general circulation in Antigua.59  The U.S. government 
commenced a claim against Swiss American in the United 
States District Court in New York, asserting conversion, unjust 
enrichment, and breach of contract.60  The defendant moved to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, alleging that Swiss 
American did not conduct or solicit business within the United 
States and did not have any of its accounts or assets located 
within the United States.61  John Fitzgerald also opened the 
accounts while physically in Antigua.62 
 
 51. Szafarowicz, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 42. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 191 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 56. Id. at 35. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 23 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132 (D. 
Mass. 1998).. 
 61. Id. at 133. 
 62. Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F. 3d at 38. 
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While in the end the case was dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction,63 in this proceeding the court vacated the 
lower court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss on 
jurisdictional grounds.  First, the court determined that 
jurisdiction would not be properly based upon the 
Massachusetts long-arm statute allowing personal jurisdiction 
over persons who cause injury within Massachusetts when they 
conduct, solicit or derive substantial revenue from a business 
conducted within the state.64  The Swiss Am. Bank court held 
that these requirements simply were not met under the 
circumstances of the case.65  However, when the court turned to 
an analysis of whether or not the Federal courts had personal 
jurisdiction under RULE 4(k)(2), an entirely different analysis 
ensued. 
Noting the order and allocation of the burden of proof in 
respect to the negation requirement of RULE 4(k)(2), the Swiss 
Am. Bank court determined for the first time that when a 
plaintiff seeks to invoke RULE 4(k)(2), he or she can make a 
prima-facie case for the applicability of the rule by simply 
alleging the following: “(1) that the claim asserted arises under 
federal law, (2) that personal jurisdiction is not available under 
any situation-specific federal statute, and (3) that the putative 
defendant’s contacts with the nation as a whole suffice to 
satisfy the applicable constitutional requirements.”66  The court 
stated that “[t]he plaintiff . . . must certify that, based on the 
information that is readily available to the plaintiff and his 
counsel, the defendant is not subject to suit in the court of 
general jurisdiction of any state.”67  If the plaintiff establishes a 
prima-facie case, the burden will then shift to the defendant to 
provide evidence that, if credited, would have to illustrate 
either that (a) the defendant would be subject to suit under at 
least one state long-arm jurisdiction statute and thus be 
amenable to jurisdiction in one or more state forums, or (b) that 
its contacts with the United States were “constitutionally 
insufficient.”68Applying this newly crafted burden-shifting 
approach to the facts at hand, the Swiss Am. Bank court 
 
 63. United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 116 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 
2000), aff’d, 274 F.3d 610 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 64. Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F. 3d at 38. 
 65. Id. at 37-38. 
 66. Id. at 41. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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decided that the determination of whether the defendant had 
adequate contacts within the United States as a whole to 
support jurisdiction was a question that required pretrial 
discovery.  Therefore, the Swiss Am. Bank court vacated both 
the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the denial 
of the plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery.69 
The Swiss Am. Bank court then used a remarkable 
analysis to convert what was in essence a common law claim of 
conversion into a claim under “federal common law”.  The court 
theorized that when the United States sued an alleged 
converter of a U.S. government check, the right of the 
government to recoup such assets found its roots in, and had to 
be adjudicated in accordance with, the federal source.70  In 
other words, since the authority of the United States to gain 
title to the disputed funds flowed from its federal power to 
punish criminals, the right to require forfeiture of racketeering 
proceeds consequently created, in the eyes of the court, a 
“federal source” for the authority of the government to bring a 
claim for conversion; thus, the claim “arises under” federal 
law.71  
Swiss Am. Bank apparently indicates that, under 
RULE 4(k)(2), a plaintiff may bring a lawsuit against a foreign 
defendant in federal court on a federal question claim (the 
subject of which may even be newly minted by the reviewing 
court as “arising under” federal common law) with absolutely 
no need to allege concrete facts that would demonstrate that 
defendant is properly subject to personal jurisdiction.  All that 
is necessary is a statement that it is possible that a plaintiff 
may later prove, after limited jurisdictional discovery, that that 
defendant has minimum contacts with the United States as a 
whole.  This is clearly an extraordinary holding and 
demonstrates an exceedingly expansive view of federal 
jurisdiction, though one that has been cited with approval by a 
number of courts outside the First Circuit.72 
 
 69. Id. at 42. 
 70. Id. at 43. 
 71. Id. at 42-45. 
 72. See, e.g., Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC, 47 Fed. Appx. 73, 75 (3d 
Cir. 2002); see also Graduate Mgmt. Admissions Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 
2d 589, 597 (E.D. Va. 2003); Sunshine Distrib. v. Sport Auth. Mich., Inc, 157 
F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Haemoscope Corp. v. Pentapharm AG, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23387 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2002); In re Vitamins Antitrust 
Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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As may be seen in the following section, which discusses 
the application of RULE 4(k)(2) to Internet cases, the expanded 
jurisdictional reach of this statute set in motion by Swiss Am. 
Bank has continued and, when applied to the unique issues 
that involve the Internet, has had profound consequences. 
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III.  APPLICATION OF RULE 4(K)(2) TO INTERNET CASES 
To date, only a handful of courts have directly applied 
RULE 4(k)(2) to cases arising out of Internet intellectual 
property disputes.  One of the first to address this issue is 
Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int’l Ltd.73  The Quokka Sports 
court examined a claim for trademark infringement based on 
defendant’s registration and use of the domain name 
“americascup.com” by the defendant.74  The court observed that 
the level of interactivity of the defendant’s web site was 
minimal.75  No product was being sold except advertising spots 
on the website itself.76  No particular part of the web site 
supplied specific information about the availability and cost of 
such advertised space; it was necessary to e-mail the owners in 
order to obtain this information.77  The web site did, however, 
contain a travel section that offered cruises along the 
racecourse.78  The consumers could fill out an on-line order 
form and purchase a travel packet.79  Nevertheless, the court 
determined that these allegations were sufficient to set forth 
“interactive commercial activity’ and thus constituted positive 
evidence of “purposeful availment” for the purpose of satisfying 
the jurisdictional test of RULE 4(k)(2).80 
The Quokka Sports court also determined that inasmuch 
as it appeared that no particular state was being targeted by 
defendant’s web site, their U.S. contacts should be considered 
in aggregate.81  Thus, considering all contacts throughout the 
United States in conformance with RULE 4(k)(2),82 the Quokka 
Sports court held that personal jurisdiction was properly 
established.83  Thus, from the very beginning, it became clear 
that courts were inclined to take an expansive view of RULE 
4(k)(2) as it applied to Internet related matters. 
Another example of this expansive view may be found in 
 
 73. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 74. Id. at 1107-8. 
 75. Id. at 1112. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1112. 
 82. Id. at 1110-12, 1114. 
 83. Id. at 1110, 1114. 
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Toys “R” Us, Inc., v. Step Two S.A.84  In Toys “R” Us, the 
allegations of interactivity between the Spanish defendant’s 
website and the United States were exceedingly sparse: the 
websites themselves were in Spanish; all prices for goods sold 
via the Internet site were in Spanish pesetas and Buros; and 
the websites provided a contact phone number that lacked the 
country code that an overseas resident would need to dial.85  
Nevertheless, the court denied the motion to dismiss and 
granted jurisdictional discovery to allow for the possibility that 
“something else” could be unearthed in discovery that would 
sustain jurisdiction.86 
Perhaps the most stunning example of this expansive view 
of jurisdiction is found in the recent case of Graduate Mgmt. 
Admission Council v. Raju.87  In this case the defendant, a 
citizen of India, registered the domain names “GMATPlus.com” 
and “GMATPlus.net.”88  The domain names were used to 
operate a foreign web site that sold test preparation material in 
violation of U.S. copyright and trademark laws.89  The 
Graduate Mgmt. court, presuming plaintiff’s pleading to be 
true, found that the defendant’s web site facilitated ordering 
materials through a two-step process that combined a money 
transfer arrangement through a third party with on-line 
ordering through the defendant’s e-mail address.90  
Interestingly, the ordering information appeared to facilitate 
world-wide orders, but according to the Graduate Mgmt. court, 
the defendant’s website placed special emphasis on the United 
States and Canada.91 
The Graduate Mgmt. court found that the defendant’s 
 
 84. 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 85. Id. at 449-450. 
 86. Id. at 457. 
 87. 241 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 88. Id. at 590-91 
 89. Id. at 590.  The plaintiff had already established a right to copyright 
and trademark relief. The only issue before the court was whether personal 
jurisdiction could be properly exercised.  The case involved a defaulting 
defendant.  The court, therefore, presumed that the factual allegations made 
by the plaintiff were true. 
 90. Id. at 591. 
 91. Id.  This was because the website provided a toll free number for 
contacting the third party to facilitate the money transfer (Western Union or 
MoneyGram). The number was for use solely in the United States or Canada. 
No countries other that the U.S. or Canada are mentioned on the site, and 
three of the six testimonials found on the site are from customers purportedly 
within the U.S.  Id. 
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contacts with the forum state (Virginia) satisfied the state’s 
long-arm statute because the defendant had caused a tortious 
injury (interference with a trademark) within the state and had 
regularly solicited business through the website.92  These facts 
were not, however, sufficient to pass a Due Process 
examination.93  In explaining the jurisdictional findings, the 
Graduate Mgmt. court first held that mere registration of the 
domain name with a company located in the state did not 
support personal jurisdiction.94  Second, the court noted that 
potential indirect injuries sustained by colleges and 
universities that rely on GMAT scores were too indirect and 
diffuse to support a finding that the defendant specifically 
targeted Virginia.95  Though the Graduate Mgmt. court held 
that the shipment of materials to two Virginia customers was 
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, the court did note that the 
question was a close one.96  Finally, the court determined that 
the targeting of GMAC, a company located in Virginia, was 
insufficient to ground jurisdiction because there was no 
indication that the defendant could “reasonably anticipate 
being hauled into court” in Virginia since there was no showing 
that he was even aware of the company’s existence, let alone its 
existence in Virginia.97 
Up to that point the Graduate Mgmt. court’s analysis was 
relatively standard.98  However, the second part of the opinion 
is nothing short of remarkable.  The court, sua sponte, 
determined that there was an alternative basis for personal 
jurisdiction in the case under RULE 4(k)(2).99  The Graduate 
Mgmt. court specifically noted that this matter was “not raised 
 
 92. Id. at 592-93.  The Virginia long-arm statute specifically allows for 
personal jurisdiction over a person “causing tortious injury in this 
Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth if he 
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of 
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or 
services rendered, in this Commonwealth.”  Id. at 593. 
 93. Id. at 595. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 596. 
 98. It is important to recognize that Graduate Mgnt. concerns a default 
application; this was a lawsuit filed against a defendant who failed to appear 
at court.  Id. at 592.  This case was an appeal from a U.S. Magistrate’s 
determination denying the default application for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
Id. 
 99. Id. at 596-97. 
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by GMAC in its complaint or in its brief.”100  The court then 
took its analysis of defendant’s contact with Virginia and 
expanded it to consider the same minimum contacts approach, 
but with the significant difference that the relevant forum was 
now the United States as a whole rather than only Virginia.101 
Refining this new methodology, the Graduate Mgmt. court 
set forth a new spin on the famous Zippo three-part factor 
analysis for RULE 4(k)(2) purposes: 
Substituting the United States as the relevant forum, the test 
requires a showing in this case (i) that [the defendant] directed his 
electronic activity into the United States, (ii) that he did so with the 
manifest intent of engaging in business or other interactions within 
the United States, and (iii) that his activity creates a potential cause 
of action in a person within the United States that is cognizable in the 
United States’ courts.102 
Then, the Graduate Mgmt. court, reiterating its previous 
holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts in 
Virginia, determined that since the only evidence in the record 
pertained to contacts between the defendant and Virginia, it 
was therefore “apparent” that defendant had insufficient 
contacts with any other single state, and that the case was 
consequently appropriate for a finding of personal jurisdiction 
under RULE 4(k)(2).103 
Graduate Mgmt. thus provides a nearly foolproof blueprint 
for plaintiffs to plead and prove, at least for the purposes of 
surviving a motion to dismiss, jurisdiction over a non-U.S. 
defendant in Internet intellectual property disputes.  First, a 
plaintiff should allege that the defendant had minimum 
contacts with a particular state.  In the alternative, the 
plaintiff should assert that minimum contacts exist within the 
United States as a whole, which thereby permits jurisdiction 
under the rubric of RULE 4(k)(2).104 
That is precisely what happened in the well-known 
“KaZaa” case, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster.105  There, the court held that personal jurisdiction 
 
 100. Id. at 596. 
 101. Id. at 597-98. 
 102. Id. at 597. 
 103. Id. at 599. 
 104. This would, of course, assume that there are not sufficient contacts in 
any other state.  However, as the Graduate Mgmt. case shows, very little is 
apparently required to show that there is not another state that could exercise 
jurisdiction.  See supra text accompanying notes 87-103. 
 105. 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
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was proper under the California long arm statute, or, in the 
alternative, jurisdiction was proper under RULE 4(k)(2).106  
Tellingly, the court, while indicating that there were sufficient 
contacts within California, made the following observation: 
Finally, the Court notes that even if jurisdiction over Sharman [the 
KaZaa holding company] were unavailable in California state courts, 
it would nonetheless be appropriate in this Court on the basis of 
Sharman’s aggregated U.S. contacts.  Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure permits nationwide aggregation for cases 
arising under federal law, unless 1) the defendant is subject to 
jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state, or 2) 
aggregation is expressly forbidden by the relevant law.107 
Thus, these latest cases have effectively taken the concept 
of RULE 4(k)(2) and vastly expanded it.  No longer is 
RULE 4(k)(2) only to be applied in a situation where a 
jurisdiction cannot be established in any given state.  Instead, 
it has become a fallback position for a plaintiff to be able to 
keep a defendant in a federal court of the plaintiff’s choosing so 
long as there are minimum contacts aggregated on a national 
basis. 
Taken together, Grokster and Swiss Am. Bank allow for 
unproven allegations of minimum contacts with the United 
States to suffice for the purpose of pretrial jurisdictional 
discovery.108  Thus, even where no contacts are meaningfully 
demonstrated, a foreign defendant will be forced to defend itself 
on foreign soil for the limited purpose of engaging in pretrial 
jurisdictional discovery (and quite possibly for the entire 
lawsuit) based upon the most subtle of contacts with the United 
States.109  Surely, it is no exaggeration to say that by virtue of 
RULE 4(k)(2), and the extravagant construction placed upon it 
by federal courts, jurisdiction over foreign defendants for 
Internet intellectual property disputes has become nearly 
guaranteed. 
 
 106. Id. at 1094. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 55-72 & 105-107 
 109. Id. 
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IV.  RULE 4(K)(2) AND ITS LONG-TERM EFFECT 
This article has demonstrated that RULE 4(k)(2) has 
dramatically escalated the potential for U.S. plaintiffs to haul 
an unwilling foreign entity within the jurisdiction of the United 
States judicial system for the purpose of adjudicating virtually 
all intellectual property disputes involving the Internet.  One 
must ask what the long-term effect of this dramatic assertion of 
authority will ultimately be. 
The reader is reminded of the controversy that erupted in 
2002 when the Australian High Court, in Dow Jones & Co., Inc. 
v. Gutnick,110 held that Dow Jones & Company could be sued in 
the Australian courts in a defamation case arising out of the 
publication of an article involving an Australian national on its 
Barron’s website.111  Under Rule 7.01 of the Victorian Rules, 
Australia’s version of a long-arm jurisdictional statute, 
Gutnick’s defamation claim was construed as a tort claim that 
caused injury “within” Victoria as a result of a tortious act 
occurring outside of the territory.112  The Court theorized that 
the injury occurred within Victoria because the Dow Jones’ 
news article was viewable in Victoria and claims for damages 
were limited to that jurisdiction.113  Consequentially, the Dow 
Jones article was a “publication” and caused injury to Gutnick’s 
reputation because “publication” occurred within Victoria.114  
Therefore, jurisdiction was properly located within Victoria.115  
Dow Jones has, not surprisingly, been condemned as being a 
grossly inappropriate exercise of local jurisdiction that may 
have a chilling effect on the free flow of information and create 
a “spider web” of potential litigation throughout the world.116 
Is the assertion of power by the Dow Jones Court any 
different from the aggressive reach of RULE 4(k)(2) for Internet-
based intellectual property disputes?  Moreover, is it any 
coincidence that Graduate Mgmt.117 was decided in January 
 
 110. (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.). 
 111. Dow Jones, 194 A.L.R. at 433, 435, 444-46. 
 112. Id. at 445-46. 
 113. Id. at 446. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 445-46. 
 116. See. e.g., BBC News, World Edition, Australia Makes Landmark Net 
Ruling, (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2560683.stm (last visited Sept. 28, 2003). 
 117. Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. 
 82 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:1 
 
2003, one month after the Australia High Court’s ruling in Dow 
Jones?  Are the courts of the world on the brink of engaging in 
a “gotcha” game of mutually aggressive assertions of 
jurisdiction against each other’s citizens? 
These attempts at overarching authority and control over 
the world’s intellectual property marketplace may well have 
unintended consequences.  Proponents of the view that the 
United States must insist on strict regulation to bring the 
Internet into compliance with U.S. intellectual property 
standards may argue that the interests of the world might be 
well served.  Such regulation would, if successful, certainly 
police the Internet and make it compliant with western notions 
of intellectual property protection.  However, such a position by 
the United States might also lead to a contrary result: that the 
rest of the world might haul U.S. citizens into their courts and 
make those U.S. citizens adhere to the intellectual property 
regulations of those countries.  Perhaps this contest of 
jurisdiction over the Internet (which can certainly be viewed as 
a truly international forum that realistically cannot and should 
not be unilaterally controlled or even policed by any one 
country) will eventually have no winners, only losers. 
The time is now ripe for the adoption of an international 
treaty for the uniform treatment of jurisdictional questions 
involving disputes over intellectual property matters.  The 
TRIPS Agreement does not establish rules or even guidelines 
for this important topic.  One nascent effort to address this 
issue comes from the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, an intergovernmental entity composed of 
sixty-two member states (including the United States and all 
members of the European Union).118  A special commission 
from that organization, following exhaustive and apparently 
still inconclusive negotiations, has promulgated a draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (“Jurisdiction Convention”).119  Article 12 
of the Jurisdiction Convention addresses the jurisdictional 
issues in intellectual property matters and provides, in 
 
Va. 2003). 
 118. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Member States, 
at http://www.hcch.net/e/members/members.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2003). 
 119. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary 
Draft Convention On Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2003). 
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paragraph 4, that exclusive jurisdiction regarding patent and 
trademark actions which have “as their object the registration, 
validity, [or] nullity, [or revocation or infringement]”120 shall 
exist in “the courts of the Contracting State in which the 
deposit or registration [of the patent, trademark or other 
similar rights] has been applied for, has taken place or, under 
the terms of an international convention, is deemed to have 
taken place.”121  The next section, paragraph 5, confusingly 
provides that “[i]n relation to proceedings which have as their 
object the infringement of patents, the preceding paragraph 
does not exclude the jurisdiction of any other court under the 
Convention or under the national law of a Contracting 
State.”122 
Legal commentators report that the draft is clearly an 
“evolving document” which does not yet reveal a consensus as 
to jurisdictional matters generally.123  Certainly, as the draft 
convention reveals, no consensus has emerged as to 
jurisdictional issues concerning either intellectual property 
matters generally or those related to the Internet. 
An alternative method for resolving jurisdictional disputes 
involving the Internet would be for all agreeable countries to 
stipulate, through treaty, to apply a modified conflicts of law 
formula.  The formula would determine not whether a country 
can assert jurisdiction through a finding of minimum contacts, 
but rather what country’s jurisdiction should be the one to 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction because it has the most 
significant relationship to the controversy.  Under such a 
scenario, the court where an international intellectual property 
dispute concerning the Internet is brought would first be asked 
to make a preliminary jurisdictional review to determine what 
country and thereby what court system has the most 
significant relationship to the transaction at issue and with the 
parties. 
To assist in this analysis, a court could use the approach 
found in the Restatement (Second) of the Conflicts of Laws 
(“Restatement”).124  Section 188 of the Restatement sets forth 
 
 120. Id. (substitutions in original). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See generally, Ray August, International Cyber Jurisdiction; A 
Comparative Analysis, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 531, 557-58 (2002) (discussing current 
developments in cyberspace jurisdiction). 
 124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1971). 
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the relevant factors for determining what law governs a 
contract dispute.125  A modified version of this approach could 
be used for determining the proper jurisdiction in an Internet 
intellectual property disputes.  Such a version might look like 
this: 
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue of 
intellectual property rights are determined by the local law of the 
state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant 
relationship to the intellectual property matter in issue and the 
parties. 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the 
contacts to be taken into account include: 
(a) the place where the intellectual property rights originated, 
(b) the place where the intellectual property protection is being 
sought or claimed, 
(c) the location where the intellectual property rights are involved, 
and 
(d) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and 
place of business of the parties. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative 
importance with respect to the particular issue. 
(3) If the place where the intellectual property rights originated, the 
place where the intellectual property protection is being sought or 
claimed and the location where the intellectual property rights are 
involved are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually 
be applied. 
 
 125. § 188, the “Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the 
Parties” states: 
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in 
contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with 
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the 
transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. 
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 
187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles 
of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: 
(a) the place of contracting, 
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract, 
(c) the place of performance, 
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and 
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place 
of business of the parties. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative 
importance with respect to the particular issue. 
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of 
performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will 
usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 
203. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §188 (1971). 
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In this way, the general concepts set forth in Section 188 of 
the unmodified Restatement would be used to find proper 
jurisdiction for Internet intellectual property disputes.  Part 
one of a modified Restatement (“Modified Restatement”) would 
essentially remain the same.  The governing jurisdiction shall 
be the one with the most significant relationship between the 
intellectual property matter and the parties in dispute. 
Part two of Section 188 would be modified to address 
factors relating to the underlying intellectual property rather 
than the underlying contract.  In Section 188(2)(a), “the place of 
contracting” would be replaced by “the place where the 
intellectual property rights originated.”  Section 188(2)(b) 
would be dropped because the “place of the negotiation of the 
contract” has no direct analog with Internet relationships.  
Factor (2)(b) of a Modified Restatement (i.e. replacing Section 
188(2)(c) of the unmodified Restatement), would be “the place 
where the intellectual property protection is being sought or 
claimed” would replace “the place of performance.”  Similarly, 
factor (2)(c) of a Modified Restatement, “the location where the 
intellectual property rights were involved,” would replace “the 
location of the subject matter of the contract.”  Factor (2)(d) of a 
Modified Restatement would remain the same as in Section 
188(2)(e) because the state of residence of the parties is 
obviously relevant.  Finally, part 3 of a Modified Restatement 
would also remain essentially unchanged.  In the case where 
parts (a), (b) and (c) of a Modified Restatement point to one 
jurisdiction, that jurisdiction will usually be the correct 
jurisdiction for the case. 
Although this framework would require refinement by 
courts and/or lawmakers, it would provide a starting point for a 
logical, measured and reasonable set of criteria for determining 
personal jurisdiction in Internet intellectual property cases.  
Until a system such as this proposed Modified Restatement is 
in place, it is likely that global dueling for jurisdictional 
advantage will continue unabated. 
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CONCLUSION 
The recent amendment to RULE 4(k)(2) provides a powerful 
tool for U.S. plaintiffs in their efforts to protect U.S. based 
intellectual property rights in disputes concerning the Internet.  
Courts have taken a remarkably expansive and generous view 
of the reach of this RULE 4(k)(2) and have allowed U.S. 
plaintiffs to haul international defendants in for pretrial 
jurisdictional discovery on the most minimum of allegations. 
RULE 4(k)(2) no doubt fulfils a significant role in the U.S. 
jurisdictional system by allowing a U.S, plaintiff to, in certain 
circumstances, assert claims against a foreign national.  
However, questions remain about the possible repercussions 
within the global judicial system.  It is certainly possible that 
the early rumblings of a jurisdictional duel between countries 
over intellectual property matters may escalate to all-out 
jurisdictional war.  The only sure way to avoid such a 
consequence is for all countries to agree to a treaty which will, 
once and for all, provide a systemic and fair way for signatory 
countries to determine which jurisdiction should resolve such 
disputes.  Unless this occurs, the jurisdictional duel will 
doubtlessly continue. 
 
